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PARTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Rosalind Dixon* 
Thirty years ago, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Supreme Court faced an important 
question of constitutional interpretation:  in cases where the Court is being asked to develop the 
meaning of the Constitution by common law means and considers democratic constitutional 
understandings to be relevant, how should it respond to the existence of a parallel proposal to 
amend the Constitution by means of Article V?  The Justices divided sharply on this issue, and 
since then, neither the Court nor constitutional scholars have addressed this question.  This article 
addresses this gap in the constitutional scholarship by defending the view adopted by Justice 
Brennan in Frontiero—that proposed amendments should carry positive rather than negative 
significance for the purposes of common law interpretation—and proposing that it should in fact 
be expended, as one potentially valuable means of responding to what it argues is the undue 
difficulty of successful constitutional amendment under Article V.   
INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years ago, in Frontiero v. Richardson,1 the Supreme Court 
faced a novel and important question of constitutional interpretation:  
in cases where the Court is being asked to develop the meaning of 
the Constitution by common law means,2 how should it respond to 
the existence of a parallel proposal to amend the Constitution by 
means of Article V, such as the proposed Equal Rights Amendment of 
1972 (ERA)?3 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  Thanks to Adam Cox, Jake 
Gersen, Tom Ginsburg, Alison LaCroix, Eric Posner, Adam Samaha, Geof Stone, Lior 
Strahilevitz, David Strauss, Adrian Vermeule, and participants in workshops at Harvard 
Law School and the University of Chicago Law School for extremely helpful comments 
on earlier versions of this paper.  Thanks are also due to Emily Tancer, Ambika Singh and 
Galina Fomenkova for excellent research assistance, and to Richard Holden for permis-
sion to use the calculations in Parts I and IV derived from joint work on constitutional 
amendment.  My thanks are also due to the Russell Baker Scholars Fund for research as-
sistance. 
 1 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973).  While the same question implicitly presented itself forty 
years earlier in United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) (dealing with 
the issue of child labor regulation while a constitutional amendment on point had passed 
Congress but had yet to be ratified), the Supreme Court in that case in no way averted to 
or addressed the question. 
 2 For the idea of common law constitutional interpretation, see David A. Strauss, Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879–80 (1996) (“The common law 
approach restrains judges more effectively, is more justifiable in abstract terms than tex-
tualism or originalism, and provides a far better account of our practices.”). 
 3 For information on the history of the Equal Rights Amendment, which was passed by the 
House and Senate in 1972 but failed to be ratified by the necessary three-fourths of the 
states, see generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986). 
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Almost all the Justices in Frontiero implicitly agreed that “partial 
amendments” such as the ERA provided relevant information about 
democratic constitutional understandings.4  At the same time, they 
disagreed sharply as to whether such information should be treated 
as weighing in favor of—or against—a decision to interpret the Con-
stitution in a parallel direction. 
Justice Brennan held for four Justices that the ERA provided clear 
affirmative support for a decision by the Court to apply strict scrutiny 
to sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause (“the 
positive view”).5  Justice Powell, by contrast, held for three Justices 
that as an amendment not yet ratified by the states, at least for some 
period, the ERA pointed in exactly the opposite direction—namely, 
against, rather than in favor, of a decision by the Court to apply any 
form of heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sex or gender 
(“the negative view”).6 
Since Frontiero, despite numerous proposed constitutional 
amendments, there has been no opportunity for the Court itself to 
revisit this question and no serious attempt by scholars to consider 
how the Court should go about the task of interpreting the Constitu-
tion in the shadow of partially complete, or failed, amendments un-
der Article V.7  This Article addresses this gap in the constitutional li-
terature, by arguing that the Court should endorse the Brennan 
position in Frontiero—as a means of mitigating what, it argues, is the 
undue difficulty of Congress using Article V in order to pass actual 
constitutional amendments. 
The disagreement among the Justices in Frontiero, the Article sug-
gests, was in essence about the merits of the hurdles Article V creates 
to Congress influencing the direction of constitutional meaning:  on 
the positive view, endorsed by Justice Brennan, Congress has implicit 
scope to influence constitutional meaning even without the ability to 
obtain the support of state legislatures as required by Article V; whe-
reas on the negative view endorsed by Justice Powell, Congress will 
 
 4 411 U.S. at 678, 687–88, 691.  Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, 
Marshall, Powell, and Blackmun all took this position.  The two justices who did not ex-
plicitly consider, and thus endorse, this position were Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id. at 692. 
 7 But for an extremely useful descriptive account of the phenomenon of partial constitu-
tional amendments, see generally Michael J. Lynch, The Other Amendments:  Constitutional 
Amendments that Failed, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 303 (2001) (exploring the status of proposed but 
unratified amendments to the United States Constitution). 
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have power to engage in successful constitutional “dialogue”8 with the 
Court if, and only if, it can achieve both super-majority agreement 
and ratification by three-quarters of states legislatures (or conven-
tions). 
There are two reasons, in turn, to prefer the view of Justice Bren-
nan to that of Justice Powell about the merits of Article V:  first, pro-
gressive increases in the number of states in the U.S.—or the “deno-
minator” for the purposes of Article V9—have meant that Article V’s 
ratification requirements have effectively become more onerous, over 
time; and second, by global standards, Article V imposes some of the 
 
 8 For a general description of my preferred account the concept of dialogue, see Rosalind 
Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
235, 239, 272 (2009) [hereinafter Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada] (arguing that di-
alogue consists of a process of give-and-take between courts and legislatures in the 
process of constitutional interpretation, according to which courts attempt to promote 
their preferred reading of constitutional norms in “first look” cases, but defer to any con-
trary, minimally reasonable legislative judgments in “second look” cases).  For different 
accounts of the idea of dialogue in the U.S. context, see generally NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS 
FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 238 (2004); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIALOGUES:  INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); Dan T. Coenen, A Constitu-
tion of Collaboration:  Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialo-
gue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1582–83 (2001); Paul R. Dimond, Provisional Review:  An 
Exploratory Essay on an Alternative Form of Judicial Review, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 201, 
201–02 (1985); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 580–81 
(1993); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186, 
1198 (1992); Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy:  What Role for the 
Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 676–77 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Pro-
tecting the Constitution from the People:  Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 
1, 3 (2003).  For other discussions of dialogue in a comparative context, see also KENT 
ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL:  JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 
295 (2001); Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 75, 80–81 (1997); Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. 
Wright, Charter Dialogue Revisited—Or “Much Ado About Metaphors,” 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
1, 7 (2007); Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court 
and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 481 (2001); Kent Roach, Constitutional, Re-
medial, and International Dialogues About Rights:  The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
537 (2005); Kent Roach, Dialogic Judicial Review and its Critics, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 49 
(2004); Kent Roach, A Dialogue About Principle and a Principled Dialogue:  Justice Iacobucci’s 
Substantive Approach to Dialogue, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 449 (2007).  
 9 Cf.  Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules:  The Denominator 
Problem, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Di-
xon & Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules] (showing that there is a significant nega-
tive relationship between the size of legislative voting bodies and the rate of constitutional 
amendment in various states, indicating that population increases are likely to increase 
the difficulty of constitutional amendment). 
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most onerous hurdles in the world for the ratification of amend-
ments.10 
Indeed, from both a historical and comparative perspective, the 
Article argues, there is an argument that even the requirements un-
der Article V governing the proposal of amendments are too oner-
ous.  Compared to other countries, there are also few other formal 
mechanisms available to Congress, outside Article V, by which to in-
fluence constitutional meaning.  From a democratic perspective, 
therefore, there is a strong argument that the Court should in fact 
extend Brennan’s approach in Frontiero to apply to all amendment 
proposals that obtain majority support in Congress—i.e., endorse a 
general principle of partial constitutional amendment. 
A proposed amendment would clearly have weakest force, under 
such a principle, where it enjoyed only majority support in Congress.  
In cases of actual super-majority support, or support at a state level, it 
would enjoy increased significance.  However, it would have a nega-
tive impact on the chance of parallel Court-led constitutional change 
if, and only if, it was actually actively considered, but rejected, by a 
majority of either or both houses of Congress. 
Because of this, recognition of a principle of partial constitutional 
amendment would directly increase the ability of both Congress and 
state legislatures to engage in successful parallel dialogue with the 
Court, by ordinary legislative means.  By providing an additional 
“plus” factor in support of the validity of such legislative attempts at 
dialogue, in at least some cases, such a principle would inevitably 
help tip the balance in favor of a decision by the Court to uphold cer-
tain legislation as constitutional.  The more clearly and broadly the 
Court recognized such a principle, the more likely it would also be 
that Congress would in fact pass partial amendments of a kind that 
could lead to this result. 
There are, of course, a number of potential objections to a prin-
ciple of partial constitutional amendment—most notably that it ig-
nores the text of Article V and that it shifts the role of the Supreme 
Court too far in a pro-majoritarian direction, thereby undermining 
the Court’s capacity to protect minority rights even in a modest, di-
alogic spirit; or, that it instead tends to move the Court in a less, ra-
 
 10 Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION:  THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 265 tbl. 
11 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (demonstrating that in comparison to the constitutions 
of other countries, the United States Constitution is most difficult to amend). 
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ther than more, pro-majoritarian direction.11  On close examination, 
however, none of these objections seems sufficient to justify the out-
right rejection of a principle of partial amendment. 
The argument proceeds in five parts.  Part I analyzes the disa-
greement among the Justices in Frontiero and explains how this disa-
greement relates to the merits of Article V itself.  Part II.A outlines 
the arguments that the ratification requirements imposed by Article 
V are too onerous from a historical and comparative perspective, 
while Part II.B makes similar arguments in relation to the require-
ments Article V imposes for the congressional proposal of amend-
ments.  Part III sets out the core idea of a principle of partial consti-
tutional amendment and explains how it would help reduce the 
hurdles to Congress (and state legislatures) in successfully influen-
cing the development of constitutional meaning.  Part IV considers 
the three most plausible objections to such a principle and the logical 
and empirical answers to such objections.  Part V concludes by consi-
dering the radical nature of such a principle and the actual chances 
of success for such a principle, given the likely obstacles to its initial 
adoption by the Court. 
I.  THE RELEVANCE OF PARTIAL AMENDMENTS & THE INFORMATIONAL 
FUNCTION OF ARTICLE V 
The Supreme Court, over time, has shown a clear willingness to 
consider information about democratic constitutional understand-
ings—or the constitutional understandings of a majority of Ameri-
cans—in interpreting various provisions of the Constitution.12 
In the context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 
Court has long looked to “evolving standards of decency” among or-
 
 11 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW (1980) (discussing the arguments for and against constitutional “interpretivism” 
and “noninterpretivism,” which correlate to commitment to the written constitution and 
willingness to go beyond the four corners of the document, respectively). 
 12 On the idea of democratic constitutional understandings, and democratic constitutional-
ism more generally, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in 
THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 25, 27 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (defining 
“democratic constitutionalism” as a term used to express the paradox that constitutional 
authority depends on both its democratic responsiveness and its legitimacy as law); Robert 
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreward:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution:  Culture, 
Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8–11 (2003)(arguing that constitutional law and cul-
ture are locked in a dialectic relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and 
in turn regulates culture); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:  Democratic Constitutional-
ism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (defining democratic consti-
tutionalism as a model by which constitutional rights have historically been established in 
the context of cultural controversy). 
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dinary Americans in order to determine whether a punishment vi-
olates the Clause.13  Under the Due Process Clause, it has looked to 
actual democratic practices and state-level legislative trends in order 
to ascertain the content of “evolving” American traditions regarding 
liberty.14  And in the context of the Equal Protection Clause, it has 
frequently looked to the attitudes of a wide variety of citizens and or-
ganizations regarding norms of equal protection.15 
In the context of Article V, the Court has treated successful 
amendments as having exactly this same kind of informational value 
or relevance.  A good example of this involves the Eleventh Amend-
ment and its relationship to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisolm 
v. Georgia.16  In Chisolm, the Court held that the plaintiff, as a citizen 
of South Carolina, could file a suit in the original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court against the state of Georgia, as the defendant.  The 
decision met with strong opposition from the states, which in turn led 
to the rapid enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, providing that 
“[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State.”17 
The Supreme Court then responded by overruling Chisolm, hold-
ing that the Constitution did not in fact permit states to be sued in 
federal courts by citizens of other states.18  In taking this position, in 
 
 13 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561, 578–79 (2005) (forbidding the imposition 
of the death penalty on minors); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312, 321 (2002) (find-
ing that execution of mentally incapacitated individuals is Constitutionally impermissi-
ble); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 104 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding that Con-
gress exceeded war power abilities in passing a statute expatriating a person who had no 
allegiance to another nation). 
 14 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (recognizing that the right to 
liberty grants a right to engage in consensual sexual activity in the home without govern-
ment intervention). 
 15 See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (holding that classifications 
based on sex should attract heightened scrutiny; the plurality both noted that over the 
previous decade “Congress . . . itself [had] manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-
based classifications,” and also suggested that “this conclusion of a coequal branch” was of 
clear significance for the purposes of interpreting the scope of the guarantee of equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 16 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 18 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress from granting suits by Indian 
tribes); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 282 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (interpreting Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as removing Article III jurisdic-
tion only in cases where it is based solely on diversity jurisdiction, rather than federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Marshall, J.) 
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Hans v. Louisiana, 19 the Court also treated the Eleventh Amendment 
as an important source of information about democratic constitutional 
disagreement, noting that both the general “manner in which [Chi-
solm v. Georgia] was received by the country [and] the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment” provided a reason why the Court was “at liber-
ty to prefer Justice Iredell’s views” in Chisolm to those of the majority 
in Chisolm.20 
In Frontiero itself, almost all the Justices likewise agreed that partial 
amendments such as the ERA provided a valuable source of informa-
tion about democratic constitutional understandings.21  There is also 
good reason for this. 
For one, legislation proposed under Article V supplies better in-
formation than ordinary legislation (or even ordinary legislative reso-
lutions) about the strength of congressional judgments about consti-
tutional meaning.  Given the level of public support for the 
Constitution, any explicit proposal by Congress to amend the Consti-
tution is likely to carry political costs not present in the case of ordi-
nary legislation.22  At the very least, this means that, if they take this 
path, members of Congress must devote additional resources to per-
suading voters that such legislation is justified (i.e., incur “persuasion 
costs”).23  By simply invoking the rubric of formal constitutional 
amendment, therefore, members of Congress with the strongest views 
about constitutional meaning can send a credible signal about their 
type.24  Given the costs involved in invoking Article V, it will almost 
 
(adopting a narrow view of the trumping function of the Eleventh Amendment, as inap-
plicable to defensive writs of error).    
 19 134 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1890).   
 20 Id.  In subsequent cases, the Court has also understood the Eleventh Amendment in ex-
actly this same way.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment in exactly this same way, as standing, as Justice Rehn-
quist noted in Seminole Tribe, not “so much for what it says, but for the presupposition 
[or particular preferred approach] . . . which it confirms”) (omission in original). 
 21 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687–88, 691–92. 
 22 Cf. Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 51 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) 
(arguing that we should make it easier to amend the constitution). 
 23 On persuasion and bargaining costs, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT:  LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 68 (2d 
ed. 1967) (“If two or more persons are required to agree on a single decision, time and ef-
fort of another sort is introduced—that which is required to secure agreement. . . . As un-
animity is approached, dramatic increases in expected decision-making costs may be pre-
dicted.”). 
 24 On the logic of this kind of signaling process generally, see, e.g., Michael Spence, Job 
Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973) (discussing signaling in the context of em-
ployment markets). 
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never be in the interest of legislators with less intense views to express 
their views in this same form.25 
Compared to ordinary legislation, Article V proposals also give 
Congress (and state legislatures) broader scope to express disagree-
ment with courts about constitutional meaning, consistent with res-
pecting commitments to the rule of law.26  In the case of ordinary leg-
islation, the expression of broad legislative disagreement with a court 
can often mean directly ignoring the legal force of particular prior 
court decisions, in a way that raises clear rule of law concerns.27  Un-
der Article V, by contrast, Congress is able to express a broad desire to 
overrule the Court in a particular area, while still fully respecting the 
legal force of particular prior precedents.28 
The hard question in Frontiero therefore was not whether the 
Court should treat the ERA as a relevant source of information about 
democratic constitutional understandings.  Rather, it was whether the 
Court should treat the ERA as weighing in favor of—or against—a 
decision by the Court to follow Congress’ preferred interpretation of 
the Equal Protection Clause in the context of classifications based on 
sex. 
Justice Brennan was prepared to treat both ordinary legislation 
and a proposed amendment such as the ERA as providing affirmative 
 
 25 Id. 
 26 On different meanings of the rule of law, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a 
Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (discussing four concep-
tions of the Rule of Law:  historicist, formalist, Legal Process type, and substantive). 
 27 This is one potential reason why it may be difficult for Congress to use statutory means in 
order to abrogate the doctrine of stare decisis in particular cases.  Cf. Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute:  May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and 
Casey?, 109 YALE L. J. 1535, 1538 (2000) (finding that the benefit of such a statute might 
persuade the court to overrule precedent).  The same difficulty also potentially arises in 
the context of other potential substitutes for constitutional amendment, for example, 
those substitutes that focus on mechanisms such as jurisdiction stripping or Court pack-
ing proposed by many departmentalists.  See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 249 (2004) (suggesting 
that in a departmentalist theory, “Justices can be impeached, the Court’s budget can be 
slashed, the President can ignore its mandates, Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or 
shrink its size or pack it with new members or give it burdensome new responsibilities or 
revise its procedures,” and that these are all legitimate tools of legislative and executive 
disagreement); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 14–
17 (1999)(detailing how the executive branch can interpret how to faithfully execute the 
laws how it sees fit despite the holding of the judiciary in a particular case or controversy); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:  Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 223, 227 (1994) (arguing that the executive branch has, or should have, 
the greatest power to interpret the law based on the authors’ logical reading of the fra-
mers’ “fundamental structural premises”). 
 28 This, of course, is subject to potential strategic effects.  Cf. infra notes 120–22. 
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support for a decision by the Court to apply heightened scrutiny to 
classifications based on sex.  Both the ERA, as well as prior legislation 
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act 
of 1963, Brennan suggested, provided clear evidence of “an increas-
ing sensitivity to sex-based classifications” and a view that “classifica-
tions based upon sex are inherently invidious” on the part of Con-
gress.29  Given Congress’ standing as a co-equal branch of 
government, its attitudes towards classifications based on gender were 
also “not without significance” to the Court’s own approach, accord-
ing to Brennan.30 
Justice Powell, by contrast, held that because the ERA was still 
pending before the states, it was “prematur[e] and unnecessar[y]” for 
the Court to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based on 
sex.31  If the ERA were rejected, Powell seemed further to suggest, this 
would be a “major political decision” which the Court itself should 
give effect to in resolving the relevant constitutional question.32 
To a substantial degree, the merits of the two different positions 
also turn directly on how one views the reasonableness of the ratifica-
tion requirements established by Article V for successful constitution-
al amendment.  Under Brennan’s approach to proposed amend-
ments, the mere act of Congress proposing an amendment may in 
some cases be sufficient to tip the balance in favor of a decision by 
the Court to develop constitutional meaning in the direction favored 
by Congress,33 whereas under Powell’s approach, Congress will be 
able to exert such influence only where it is able to obtain the sup-
port of three-quarters of state legislatures. 
The more unreasonable the requirements for the ratification of 
proposed amendments under Article V, therefore, the more sense 
Brennan’s position makes compared to Powell’s. Conversely, the 
more reasonable those requirements are judged to be, the more sense 
Powell’s approach makes compared to Brennan’s. 
II.  ARTICLE V & THE (UNDUE) DIFFICULTY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 
Two factors, this Part argues, support the position taken by Justice 
Brennan over that of Justice Powell in this context:  first, the fact that 
 
 29 Frontiero v Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973). 
 30 Id. at 687–88. 
 31 Id. at 692. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See infra text accompanying note 107. 
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increases in the number of states over time have made the require-
ments for the ratification of proposed amendments progressively 
more difficult to satisfy; and second, the fact that, from a comparative 
perspective, the requirements for the ratification of amendments in 
the U.S. are unusually onerous. 
A  The (Undue) Difficulty of Ratification 
The size of a voting body, or the number of decision-makers rele-
vant to a decision, has the potential to influence the difficulty of a 
particular voting rule amendment for two inter-related reasons. 
One reason is that decision making will tend to be substantially 
more costly in larger decision-making bodies than in smaller ones:  
both the opportunity cost implicit in the time taken to debate and 
vote on certain proposals and the costs associated with the potential 
for “hold-up” by some members of a collective decision-making body 
will tend consistently to increase with the size of a representative de-
cision-making body, such as Congress or state legislatures.34 
The law of large numbers is another reason why, in larger voting 
bodies, it can be harder to obtain the super-majority of votes neces-
sary for a successful constitutional amendment.35  If voter preferences 
are drawn at least semi-randomly from an overall (hypothetical) dis-
tribution of views on questions of amendment, the law of large num-
bers means that in a large decision-making body it is far less likely, 
than in a smaller decision-making body that there will be an idiosyn-
cratic draw of preferences so as to create a super-majority in favor of a 
proposed amendment.  This is illustrated by the probability of obtain-
ing a super-majority of “votes” in favor of a proposed amendment by 
a simple coin toss, where “heads” is treated as a vote in favor of 
changing the status quo, and “tails” as a vote for the status quo.  For a 
voting body of, say, 3 or 6, the probability of successful amendment in 
this context will be 50% and 34%, respectively, whereas for a voting 
body of 12 or 24, the probability will fall to 19% or 8%.36 
 
 34 See generally Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Designing Constitutional Amendment 
Rules To Scale, available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.holden/
papers/DH.pdf [hereinafter Dixon & Holden, Designing Constitutional Amendment Rules] 
(detailing that large legislative bodies will be less likely to amend a constitution because 
of procedural difficulties as well as the tendency for legislatures to coalesce around a me-
dian voter position). 
 35 Id. 
 36 For a voting body with 100 members, the probability of successful amendment falls below 
1%.  This effect is also quite general and does not depend on the binary nature of out-
comes in the “coin flip” setting.  It applies even where there is a continuum of voter pre-
ferences and policy choices.  See Richard Holden, Supermajority  Voting Rules (Aug. 2, 2009) 
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Over time, there has, of course, been a clear increase in the num-
ber of states in the U.S.  In 1789, there were only 13 states, as com-
pared to 50 states from 1967 onwards.  All else being equal, this 
change in the denominator for Article V has implied a directly pro-
portionate increase in the difficulty of ratifying proposed amend-
ments.37 
On one calculation, if one were to try to adjust for this change in 
the denominator for Article V, the functional equivalent to the 75% 
super-majority requirement adopted by the framers would in fact now 




FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OVER TIME TO A 3/4 SUPER-MAJORITY 
VOTING RULE FOR STATE RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS (ADJUSTING 










 Under such an adjusted super-majority rule, the ERA itself would 
also clearly have passed by the time the Court heard Frontiero, consi-
 
(Univ. of Chicago and NBER, Working Paper), available at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/Richard.holden/papers/index.html [hereinafter Hol-
den, Supermajority Voting Rules]. 
 37 One obvious other change over this period has been the rise of political parties: see BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS (1991); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard J. Pildes, 
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006).  However, it is not clear 
that once political parties developed, there was then any further relevant change in the 
overall degree of polarization or degree of correlated voting among state legislatures (or 
even members of Congress, at least until the 1980’s).  See Dixon & Holden, Designing Con-
stitutional Amendment Rules, supra note 33, at 20. 
 38 That is, a 75% super-majority rule for a voting population of 13 is roughly equivalent to 
62% voting rule for a population of 50, if one wishes to maintain the same functional 
trade-off between the advantages of constitutional flexibility and rigidity.  Holden, Super-
majority Voting Rules, supra note 35. 
654 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
dering that by 1979, the amendment had been ratified by 35 (or 
70%) states.39 
From a global perspective, there is also a further argument that 
Article V imposes ratification requirements that are overly unduly 
onerous.40  Global constitutional practices do not, of course, always 
point to “right” answers from an American perspective.  However, in 
the context of rules governing constitutional amendment, there is lit-
tle reason to think that the U.S. is in any way truly “exceptional” in its 
constitutional commitments—or experience.41  Global norms regard-
ing constitutional amendment, therefore, have an important poten-
tial to shed light on the “optimal” difficulty of amendment from an 
American perspective.42  These norms also consistently point to the 
desirability of less onerous requirements for the ratification of 
amendment than apply under Article V. 
While many constitutions impose some form of ratification re-
quirement, most do so, for example, in the form of far less demand-
ing national referendum requirements.43  Among federal systems, Ar-
ticle V also imposes requirements for state-based ratification that are 
some of the most demanding in the world.44  The effect of this, Do-
nald Lutz has further found, is to dampen the overall rate of 
amendment in the U.S. by roughly a factor of three, compared to 
other federal systems.45 
 
 39 See Memorandum from David C. Huckabee, Specialist, Am. Nat’l Gov’t and Fin. Div., to 
Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney (Aug. 19, 2004), available at 
http://maloney.house.gov/documents/olddocs/era/081904crsERAratification.pdf.  
Even if one were to subtract the five who attempted to rescind their ratification during 
this period under this adjusted requirement, there would also still have been the neces-
sary 62% level of ratification required for the amendment to take effect prior to 1979.  
This is particularly relevant given that South Carolina purported to rescind its ratification 
prospectively, if ratification did not occur by this date. 
 40 See Lutz, supra note 10, at 256 (detailing how the U.S. Constitution is excessively difficult 
to ratify). 
 41 For a more general exploration of the extent of American exceptionalism in a constitu-
tional context, see Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and Reality of American Exceptionalism, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 391 (2008). 
 42 For the general informational value of foreign experience or design choices in this set-
ting, see, e.g., Eric A Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
131, 133–34 (2006) (discussing that contrary to popular notion, the United States rou-
tinely consults the decisions of other states in making its laws). 
 43 Lutz, supra note 10, at 263–65. 
 44 Id. 
 45 When Donald Lutz constructed this measure in 1992, the U.S. was second only to Yugos-
lavia in terms of difficulty of amendment, and Yugoslavia’s constitution is now defunct.  It 
is, of course, possible that since then, a constitution with a more onerous amendment 
rule has been adopted.  Inspection of post-1992 constitutions, however, does not support 
this conjecture. 
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B.  The Undue Difficulty of Proposing Amendments 
There is, in fact, an argument from both a historical and compar-
ative perspective that Article V makes even the proposal of amend-
ments by Congress too difficult. 
There are important reasons from a democratic perspective for 
the existence of formal procedures for constitutional amendment in 
most constitutions.  One reason is that changing social circumstances 
and understandings often mean constitutional “rules” prove, over 
time, to involve significant “error costs.”46  Rules of this kind also gen-
erally leave limited scope for ordinary forms of interpretive updating 
by courts.47  They can also create direct legal barriers to the ability of 
legislatures to update small “c” constitutional meaning by statutory 
means.48  Without the possibility of formal constitutional amendment, 
therefore, it will often be extremely difficult for a constitutional sys-
tem to respond to demands to update such rules.49 
A second reason to allow for constitutional amendment is that 
constitutional meaning is often subject to reasonable disagreement—
disagreement of this kind is not only extremely likely in the context 
of many open-ended constitutional standards, in a constitutional de-
mocracy it is also inherently reasonable, given various interpreters’ 
different perspectives and the open-textured nature of various consti-
tutional standards.50  Where reasonable disagreement of this kind ex-
ists, as Jeremy Waldron notes, principles of equality further suggest 
that decisions about interpretation should generally be made by ref-
erence to democratic constitutional understandings.51 
However, in the U.S. context at least, the Supreme Court does not 
always act in a way that is consistent with such understandings, at least 
 
 46 Lutz, supra note 10, at 263–65; see also Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules:  A 
Comparative Perspective, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds.) (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 10) (on 
file with author) (discussing the possibility of risk-aversion by legislatures in supporting 
proposed amendments if passage is more difficult, due to fear of the difficulty of reversal 
in the event of error). 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, in 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 320–21 (Dennis 
J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules] (discuss-
ing the importance of pragmatic considerations relating to the need to respond to chang-
ing technologies and social circumstances). 
 50 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 159 (expanded ed. 2005) (finding that there is 
disagreement among people as to the more exact content and boundaries of constitu-
tional protections, and constitutional consensus is narrow in scope). 
 51 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 112–13, 149–63 (1999). 
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over the short- to medium-term.52  In at least some cases, it issues opi-
nions that are directly contrary to the reasonable judgments of a ma-
jority of Americans about constitutional meaning,53 or if not directly 
objectionable to most Americans, that, in their view, unreasonably 
block the ability of Congress to develop small “c” constitutional 
norms.54  Given this, there will be a strong argument, in at least some 
cases, for allowing Congress to “trump” the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the Constitution via means of formal procedures for con-
stitutional amendment.55 
In practice, however, Article V imposes sufficiently high hurdles to 
the proposal of constitutional amendments that in recent years Con-
gress has rarely succeeded in using amendment procedures in order 
to play either of these roles—but particularly this trumping role.56 
Take the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson,57 invalidat-
ing Texas’ prohibition against flag burning.  This was very arguably a 
 
 52 For the longer-term pressures on courts to align with majority opinion, see ROBERT A. 
DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:  PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 154–56 (4th ed. 
1981) (discussing situations in which the Court must choose among controversial alterna-
tives of public policy); see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC 
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 354 (2009) (noting instances in which Justices decided cases consistent 
with public opinions and social trends). 
 53 Two potential examples of this kind could be argued to be Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause implicates the right to abortion) and Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 387 (1989) (holding that flag burning is protected as freedom of ex-
pression under the First Amendment).  For further discussion, see infra notes 143–64; see 
also Michael Klarman, Why Backlash? (Aug. 2010) (Univ. of Chicago Public Law & Legal 
Theory Workshop Working Paper) (analyzing “court decisions that seem to retard the 
causes they purport to benefit while sometimes also producing larger political conse-
quences”). 
 54 Examples in this category might be thought to include Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–
36 (1997) (striking down Congress’s attempt to use § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993) and United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down certain core enforcement provisions of the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994). 
 55 Congress is both larger and more internally diverse overall and has members with a 
stronger incentive to invest in acquiring information about democratic understandings; 
thus, it will often do better than the Court at both identifying and acting on such under-
standings.  See, e.g, ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 83, 86 (2009) 
(“[S]everal stylized facts about legislatures threaten to give them an overwhelming Con-
dorcetian advantage:  the sheer numerosity of their members, the diversity of their mem-
berships, and their powerful institutional tools for acquiring information—including the 
relationship of representation between legislators and constituents . . . . The demands of 
re-election force legislators to leave the halls of government . . . and to meet constitu-
ents.”).  On the “trumping” function of constituional amendments, see Dixon, supra note 
45.  
 56 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
 57 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989). 
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case in which there was scope for reasonable disagreement about the 
meaning and application of the First Amendment:  the Court was 
split 5-4 both on this issue of the applicable standard of scrutiny un-
der the Free Speech Clause and the result;58 and this is an area in 
which other democratic countries have taken a variety of different 
approaches.59  The Court’s opinion itself was also quite clearly at odds 
with national majority opinion, given that in 1990, in response to 
Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman,60 68% of Americans said 
they favored an amendment to allow Congress to ban flag burning, 
while only 27% of Americans said they were opposed to such an 
amendment.61  Despite this, there has been no actual proposal by 
Congress under Article V to overturn Texas v. Johnson.  Instead, pro-
posed flag burning amendments have consistently failed to pass in 
the Senate, each time by the narrowest of margins.62 
Historically, the passage of this kind of ‘trumping’ amendment 
was much easier, in large part because both the House and Senate 
were much smaller in size.63 
 
 58 See id. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 421–35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 
436–39 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (strik-
ing down Congress’s attempt to use § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, in a 6-3 majority opinion). 
 59 Cf. Hopkinson v Police (2004) 3 NZLR (HC) 704, 717 (N.Z.) (reading down the Flags, 
Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981, s. 11(1)(b), so as to apply only to actions “vilifying” 
rather than showing  general “dishonour” to the flag). 
 60 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that a federal law against flag desecration violates free 
speech under the First Amendment). 
 61 See Heather Mason Kiefer, Support Cooling for Flag-Burning Amendment, GALLUP (July 26, 
2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/17491/Support-Cooling-FlagBurning-Amendment.
aspx (polling Americans’ support for a Constitutional amendment to criminalize flag 
burning).  This gap between the Court and public opinion has also persisted over time.  
See Joseph Carroll, Public Support for Constitutional Amendment on Flag Burning, GALLUP 
(June 29, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/23524/public-support-constitutional-
amendment-flag-burning.aspx (comparing national support for a constitutional amend-
ment to ban flag burning in the 1990s with national support at present). 
 62 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2006) (passing with a 66-34 majority); H.R.J. Res. 10, 
109th Cong. (2005) (passing with a 286-130 majority); S.J. Res. 180, 101st Cong. (1989) 
(reporting unfavorably without amendment); JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–
2002 199 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the 1995 Congressional vote on the proposed 
amendment, where the House voted 312-120 for the amendment and where the Senate 
voted 63-36 for the amendment, just short of the two-thirds majority needed); see also S.J. 
Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2006) (indicating that the Senate voted 66-34 for the Amendment, 
failing to obtain the required two-thirds majority by one vote); Carl Hulse, Flag Amendment 
Narrowly Fails in Senate Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at A1 (discussing the implications 
of the congressional vote on the proposed flag burning amendment for upcoming elec-
tions and national politics). 
 63 See Dixon & Holden, Designing Constitutional Amendment Rules, supra note 33 at 1, 14. 
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In fact, if one uses the same methodology as in Figure 1, on one 
calculation, the current functional equivalent to the original two-
thirds super-majority requirements in Article V for the proposal of 
constitutional amendments are now as low as 53% for the House, and 
62% for the Senate.64  Under these requirements, a number of failed 
amendments—including the 2006 Flag Burning amendment—would 
also again almost certainly have passed.65 
 
 
FIGURES 2, 3: 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT TO A TWO-THIRDS SUPER-MAJORITY 
MAJORITY VOTING RULE, ADJUSTING FOR INCREASES IN HOUSE AND 



















 64 See id. 
 65 See S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2006) (representing vote of 66-34).  All 50 states have passed 
non-binding resolutions endorsing the Flag Protection Act of 1989.  See 18 U.S.C. § 700 
(1989) (“Desecration of the flag of the United States; penalties”); see also Andrea Stone, 
Flag-Desecration Amendment Needs 1 More Vote, USA TODAY, June 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-12-senate-flag-amendment_x.htm 
(discussing the previous failures of the Senate to pass the flag amendment, as well as the 
likelihood of passage in the future).  Forty seven states also continue, even post-Eichman, 
to have flag burning prohibitions on their statute books.  See State Flag Protection Laws, 
FIRSTAMENDMENTCENTER.COM, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/flag
burning/topic.aspx?topic=flag_statelaws (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (listing state laws that 
prohibit the desecration of the flag or its use for advertising and publicity purposes). 













From a comparative perspective, the hurdles Article V imposes in 
this context are also unusually onerous:  in Lutz’s estimation, for ex-
ample, the two-thirds super-majority and bicameral voting require-
ments in Article V combine to reduce the probability of successful 
constitutional amendment proposals in the U.S. by more than 50%, 
compared to countries with less demanding super-majority or double-
passage requirements.66  When these requirements are added to those 
applicable at the ratification stage, Lutz further finds, the U.S. Consti-
tution is in fact the constitution that is currently the most difficult in 
the world to amend.67 
A similar conclusion applies if one looks at the actual rate of con-
stitutional amendment worldwide.  Tom Ginsburg and others, for ex-
ample, show that the predicted amendment rate for all national con-
stitutions, over time, ranges from 0 to 1 amendments per year, with a 
mean of 0.38 amendments per year.68  On this scoring, with an annual 
amendment rate of only 0.04, the U.S. also ranks almost 90% below 
the mean.69 
 
 66 These requirements add 1.6 on Lutz’s index of difficulty, and the shift from 0–1 to 1–2 on 
his index of difficulty reduces the predicted rate of amendments from 5.86 to 2.48 
amendments per year.  See Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 10 at 258–59, 262. 
 67 See id. at 261 (comparing data on selected national constitutions to analyze comparative 
difficulty of constitutional amendment). 
 68 ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 101 (2009) (comparing actual and imputed amendment rates of various 
constitutions). 
 69 Id.  Such measures do, of course, suffer from some potential problems—especially the 
potential for the rate of amendment to reflect different rates of demand for constitution-
al change in different systems.  However, once one accounts for the possibility that such 
demand is affected by both the age and length of a constitution, it seems unlikely that 
such differences would be so systematic, across a large pool of countries, that the measure 
would lose all usefulness. 
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Unlike in some other countries, there are also few other formal 
legal mechanisms, besides constitutional amendment, in the U.S. by 
which Congress (or state legislatures) may seek to override the Court. 
In Canada, for example, the hurdles to amending the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) are quite onerous:  amendments 
require the support of two-thirds of provincial legislatures, 
representing at least 50% of the population, as well as a majority of 
the Canadian Parliament.70  Both the national parliament and pro-
vincial legislatures, however, also enjoy an additional source of power 
that allows them to influence the interpretation, or at least applica-
tion, of the Charter.  Section 33 of the Charter, or the so-called “not-
withstanding clause,” allows legislatures at both levels “expressly [to] 
declare” that legislation “shall operate notwithstanding” key provi-
sions of the Charter—in each case, by ordinary majority vote.71  It can 
also be invoked both prospectively and retrospectively, in response to 
a particular court decision.72  This gives legislatures broad scope to 
override interpretations of the Charter with which they disagree, even 
without reliance on formal procedures for constitutional amend-
ment.  In practice, this power has also meant that the Supreme Court 
of Canada has tended to show greater deference to ordinary legisla-
tive attempts at dialogue in cases in which Section 33 applies, than in 
other legislative contexts.73 
In the U.S., by contrast, there are few formal mechanisms outside 
Article V by which Congress or state legislatures may effectively over-
ride a decision of the Supreme Court.74 
 
 70 See Constitution Act, 1982, c. 38, reprinted in Procedure for Amending Constitution of 
Canada, R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 44 (Can.). 
 71 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 33(1). 
 72 See Ford v. Canada (Attorney-General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. 
 73 See Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, supra note 8. 
 74 Of course, in many cases, especially those involving attempts by Congress to generate or 
jump-start, rather than trump certain forms of common law constitutional reasoning, 
congressional legislation may be an effective substitute.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215 (2001) (discussing the effects of 
“super-statutes,” which seek to “penetrate public normative and institutional culture in a 
deep way”).  However, there are important exceptions to when this will be the case, in-
cluding in cases where the Court itself in some way blocks the enactment of such statutes 
by its own approach to constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (striking down certain core enforcement provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994—a statute that might otherwise have been a candi-
date for status as a civil rights super-statute); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) 
(holding that Congress lacked power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); see also supra note 60. 
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Consider Congress’ power under Article III to enact jurisdiction-
stripping legislation “suspending” the effect of certain Court deci-
sions.75  While the outer bounds on Congress’ power under Article III 
remain uncertain, existing Supreme Court decisions in this area sug-
gest that the Court will hesitate to recognize a power on the part of 
Congress to deprive all courts of jurisdiction over constitutional con-
troversies.76  Without a comprehensive power of this kind, it will also 
be extremely difficult for Congress effectively to override a decision 
of the Court by means of Article III, because lower courts will contin-
ue to be bound by the Court’s prior decisions in exercising their on-
going jurisdiction in a particular area. 
Some scholars point to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the power Congress has “to enforce, by appropriate legislation” 
the substantive provisions of the Amendment, as an alternative source 
of override power.77  On this view, the power to enforce includes the 
power to prefer a different interpretation of the Amendment than 
that favored by the Court.78  The Supreme Court, however, has expli-
citly rejected this argument, holding that Congress does “not enforce 
a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”79  Rather, the 
Court has held, for any use by Congress of its power under Section 5 
to be given effect by the Court, it must be “congruent and propor-
 
 75 See e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 51; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  Another key mechanism of override is 
the potential for executive disobedience, especially in cases where officials are not direct-
ly parties to a case.  See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2781 (2003).  This obviously does not pertain to Congress or state legislatures directly and 
is also subject to the limitation that, in cases such as Roe and Johnson, where the legislature 
is ultimately seeking to enforce criminal punishments, cooperation from the courts is re-
quired—and therefore mere executive disobedience is often insufficient to achieve rele-
vant democratic objectives. 
 76 See, e.g., Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 261–62 (2d Cir. 1948) (suggesting 
that Congress cannot invoke its power under Article III to deny any and all judicial reme-
dies for a past constitutional violation (as defined by the Court)); see also Cary v. Curtis, 44 
U.S. (3 How.) 236, 252 (1845) (upholding the preclusion of all forms of post-deprivation 
relief in a judicial setting against the Collector of Customs, but emphasizing the impor-
tance in this context of the existence of a pre-deprivation remedy).  For further discus-
sion see generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. & JOHN F. MANNING ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 300–12 (6th ed. 2009). 
 77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 78 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:  Poli-
centric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 (2003) (de-
scribing the Rehnquist Court’s interpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 
 79 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
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tional” to remedying or preventing a constitutional injury as defined 
by the Court itself.80 
A similar analysis applies to the Senate’s power of “advice and 
consent” in relation to judicial appointments as a means of trumping 
particular decisions of the Supreme Court.  While such a power has 
clearly allowed Congress to influence the direction of constitutional 
meaning, over time,81 it has also tended to do so over a much longer 
time period than successful constitutional amendments.82 
Under Article V, if one excludes the Twenty-seventh Amend-
ment,83 the average ratification time for successful amendments has 
been one year, eight months, and seven days, with the longest period 
for successful ratification being three years, nine months, and four 
days (for the Twenty-second Amendment establishing a two-term lim-
it for the Presidency), and the shortest three months and ten days 
(for the Twenty-sixth Amendment, under which 18 became the min-
imum age which states may prescribe for the right to vote).84  When it 
comes to changes in the composition of the Court, by contrast, over 
the last three decades vacancies have tended to arise on the Court on 
average only every 3.1 years and the tenure of individual Justices has 
varied significantly, with the average recent tenure of individual Jus-
tices being as high as 26.1 years.85  Even when Congress and the Pres-
ident are fully aligned in their desire to engage in dialogue with the 
Court, this can mean that it takes between three to fifteen years for 
dialogue to succeed via such means—or nearly twice to ten times as 
long as under Article V. 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 51. 
 82 Id. 
 83 For the special status of the Twenty-seventh Amendment and its history, see, e.g., Walter 
Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change:  Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983) (discussing generally judicial review of the amendment 
process); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V:  The Constitutional Lessons of 
the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993) (examining the history and lessons 
of the twenty-seventh amendment and Article V in general); Laurence H. Tribe, A Consti-
tution We Are Amending:  In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1983) 
(refuting Professor Dellinger’s argument). 
 84 See DAVID C. HUCKABEE, RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-922, at 1, available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/97-922.pdf.  The Twenty-eventh Amendment 
is a special case because it took 202 years to ratify, and it is not clear as a result that it is in 
fact valid, or at least universally understood as such; Dellinger, supra note 83.  But see 
Tribe, supra note 82. 
 85 See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:  Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 831 (2006) (highlighting these statistics). 
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Consider the time taken for Congress successfully to override the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart86 after its ini-
tial attempt at Article V override failed.87  In 1918 in Hammer, the 
Court struck down key provisions of the Child Labor Act (CLA) of 
1916, prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of prod-
ucts manufactured in factories using child labor, on the basis that the 
true purpose of the Act was to prevent the use of child labor rather 
than to regulate the channels of interstate commerce or transporta-
tion of goods among the states, and thus it was beyond Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause.  In 1919, Congress enacted a 
new CLA imposing an “excise” tax of 10% of net profits on manufac-
turers using child labor, but two years later, in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture 
Co.,88 the Court once again struck down the revised CLA as beyond 
the power of Congress under Article I.  Applying an identical ap-
proach to that of the Court in Dagenhart to a different context (name-
ly, taxation), in Bailey the Court held that, because the purpose of the 
law was to penalize and thereby to discourage or suppress child labor, 
it was within the sphere exclusively reserved by the Constitution to 
the states, rather than Congress.89  Finally, in 1923 in Adkins v. Child-
ren’s Hospital,90 the Court struck down regulations limiting the work-
ing hours of women and children as in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.91 
Under Article V, Congress responded within a year of Adkins by 
proposing a constitutional amendment empowering Congress “to 
limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen 
years of age.”92  The Amendment was also ratified by a majority of 
states within 10 years. 
 
 86 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 87 Such an example seems particularly instructive, given that, for scholars such as David 
Strauss, this is one of the leading examples in support of the idea that the difficulty of 
amendment under Article V is in fact more or less irrelevant to the direction of common 
law constitutional development in the U.S. today.  See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of 
Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1475 (2001) (“Congress proposed the 
amendment after the Supreme Court thwarted its repeated efforts to regulate child labor 
by statute.”). 
 88 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
 89 See id. at 39. 
 90 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 91 Id. at 562. 
 92 See VILE, supra note 61, at 48 (“Section 1.  The Congress shall have power to limit, regu-
late, and prohibit the labor of persons under 18 years of age.  Section 2.  The power of 
the several states is unimpaired by this article except that the operation of state laws shall 
be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by this Con-
gress.”). 
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Absent Article V change, by contrast, it was not until 1941 and the 
retirement of the Court’s most conservative Justices—Justices McRey-
nolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter and Butler—that the Court was will-
ing formally to overrule Dagenhart and uphold provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act guaranteeing certain minimum wage and hour 
protections for workers as a valid exercise of Congress’ power under 
Article I.93 
III.  A PRINCIPLE OF PARTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
Not only do historical and global comparisons therefore provide 
support for a decision by the Court to endorse the approach of Jus-
tice Brennan over that of Justice Powell in Frontiero.  They also argua-
bly provide a rationale for the Court to extend Justice Brennan’s ap-
proach so as to apply to all amendment proposals that obtain 
majority, not just two-thirds super-majority, support in Congress. 
Of course, the mere fact that Article V may make constitutional 
amendment unduly onerous in a present-day domestic context does 
mean that it should  not be considered irrelevant whether a particu-
lar proposed amendment enjoys super-majority support in Congress 
or support among state legislatures (or conventions).  On the con-
trary, there are several reasons for the Court to give greater weight to 
the views of a super- as opposed to simple-majorities in this context:  
among other things, there is less danger where super-majority agree-
ments exists on a question of dictatorial forms of social choice, of the 
kind identified by Kenneth Arrow in the context of his “impossibility 
theorem.”94  The concern to protect state interests, and particularly 
the interests of small states, was clearly an important factor in the de-
sign not only of Article V itself, but also many other provisions of the 
Constitution.95 
 
 93 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 94 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2 (1951) (introducing 
dictatorship as a method of social choice); Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff, Aggregation 
and Social Choice:  A Mean Voter Theorem, 59 ECONOMETRICA 1 (1991) (explaining how in 
the social choice, the preferences of the median voter beats any alternative, and that the 
mean voter’s most preferred outcome is unbeatable under the 64%-majority rule). 
 95 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited:  Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited] (arguing 
that “the unenumerated rights retained by the People are primarily or exclusively indivi-
dualistic, rather than majoritarian [and] that those rights are primarily or exclusively en-
forceable through judicial, rather than political, processes”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Consent of the Governed:  Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
457, 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent of the Governed] (explaining that citizens have 
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These concerns, however, can be addressed by way of appropriate 
constitutional standards, as well as rules.96  All that is necessary for this 
to occur is that the Court give varying evidentiary force to proposed 
amendments, according to the degree of support they receive in both 
Congress and at a state level. 
The key premise of a principle of partial constitutional amend-
ment is that all majority-supported amendment proposals should en-
joy some form of positive legal significance or serve as some form of 
“plus” in favor of a decision by the Court to defer to parallel legisla-
tive attempts at constitutional dialogue; amendment proposals will 
have negative significance under such a principle if, and only if, they 
are actively debated but rejected by a majority of either House on an 
actual floor vote.  At the same time, a proposed amendment will also 
logically have weakest positive force, under such an approach, where 
it enjoys only simple majority support in Congress.  It will then pro-
gressively increase in positive weight, according to level of super-
majority support it gained in both the House and Senate and (where 
relevant) for each state that ratified it, without there being a negating 
vote by another state to reject ratification or otherwise express disap-
proval of the proposal.97  The impact of such a principle on Con-
gress’s power to engage in constitutional dialogue, therefore, will be 
 
a legal right to amend the Constitution “via majoritarian and populist mechanism akin to 
a national referendum, even though that mechanism is not explicitly specified in Article 
V”). 
 96 On this distinction in constitutional law generally, see, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword:  
The Justices of  Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
 97 Another potentially relevant factor for the Court to consider might also be the degree of 
executive support for a proposed amendment, by, for example, considering the position 
of the Solicitor General on proposed amendments.  See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND 
LAW:  ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 188–92 (1991) (not-
ing the general alignment of Solicitor General and President’s constitutional positions); 
John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics:  The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and 
Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 802 (1992) (asserting “[a]s a matter of constitu-
tional law, the Solicitor General is not independent from the President” and that he “must 
project vigorously, albeit respectfully, the President’s distinctive constitutional voice”).  
Arguably, the Court already does this in a broad range of Constitutional contexts.  See Re-
becca E. Deen et. al, The Solicitor General As Amicus 1953–2000:  How Influential?, 87 
JUDICATURE 60, 71 (2003) (noting somewhat declining but still high rates of successful in-
tervention, as more amicus briefs filed); Karen O’Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the U.S. 
Solicitor General in Supreme Court Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256, 261 (1983) (noting high 
rates of successful intervention); see also LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE:  THE 
SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 3–7 (1987) (noting the influence the Solicitor 
General has over what cases the Supreme Court decides to hear and the outcome of 
those cases); Seth P. Waxman, Foreword:  Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1115 (2001) (providing a first-hand account of how and why this is often the case). 
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directly proportionate to the degree of support a particular amend-
ment proposal enjoys at the national and state level. 
By itself, no constitutional “plus” factor will be sufficient to ensure 
the validity of all attempts by Congress to pass legislation designed to 
update constitutional rules or trump particular prior Court deci-
sions—there may be so little other support for the validity of a partic-
ular legislative measure that a partial amendment cannot save the 
constitutionality of such legislation.98  Conversely, the validity of par-
ticular legislation may also be sufficiently clear from other constitu-
tional sources that a partial constitutional amendment also lacks any 
real capacity to affect the Court’s decision—though for the opposite 
reason—that it simply serves to confirm the validity of law in ques-
tion.  In at least some cases, however, other constitutional arguments 
are likely to be sufficiently finely balanced that the mere existence (or 
recognition) of such a plus factor may be sufficient to alter the ability 
of Congress to influence the direction of constitutional meaning, and 
the stronger such a plus factor is, the more likely it is that this will be 
the case.99 
The effect of a principle of partial constitutional amendment will, 
in this respect, closely resemble the effect of a decision by the Court 
to recognize foreign and international developments as a relevant 
source of information in interpreting various provisions of the Con-
stitution:  while it may not be decisive in all cases, it will be sufficient 
in at least some cases to change the result in a particular direction.100 
Consider various Justices’ approach to foreign and international 
law in cases such as Roper v. Simmons101 and Knight v. Florida.102  In Ro-
per, while a majority of the Court was clearly willing to treat foreign 
and international law sources as relevant, none of the Justices ulti-
mately treated such sources as decisive in resolving the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty as applied to those who committed murder 
while still a juvenile.  Justice Kennedy, for example, held that because 
 
 98 This seems particularly likely in the context of attempts by Congress to update constitu-
tional rules, as opposed to engaging in dialogue about the meaning of constitutional 
standards, because in this context, the Court tends to give little ultimate weight to evolv-
ing democratic understandings about the ‘optimality’ of such rules.  See infra note 45. 
 99 Cf.  Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, supra note 48, at 334 (asserting only “where there 
is some real doubt or argument as to constitutional validity, will the constitutional ‘plus’ 
provided by such a principle potentially be decisive”). 
100 Cf. id. at 340–41 (drawing the same analogy in the context of an argument in favor of de-
ference to Congressional attempts to off-set the error costs associated with constitutional 
rules, other than Article V). 
101 See 543 U.S. 551, 574–77 (2005) (discussing the role of international law). 
102 See 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the role of international 
law). 
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other arguments against the constitutionality of the juvenile death 
penalty were sufficiently clear, “[t]he opinion of the world communi-
ty” in this particular context simply served to “provide respected and 
significant confirmation for [the Court’s own prior] conclusions.”103  
Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, held that because other consti-
tutional sources were sufficiently clear in pointing toward the consti-
tutionality of the juvenile death penalty in the U.S., there was no 
scope for the international consensus against the juvenile death pe-
nalty to play even this kind of “confirmatory role.”104 
In Knight, by contrast, in assessing a challenge to the constitutio-
nality of long delays in the carrying out of the death penalty, Justice 
Breyer seemed to suggest that foreign constitutional understandings 
were more or less sufficient to tip the balance in favor of a decision to 
grant certiorari to the petitioners.  Because there was both limited 
support in both domestic legislative trends and lower court decisions 
for finding such delays unconstitutional and strong principled argu-
ments on the other side, Breyer suggested, it was legitimate for the 
Court—at least at the certiorari stage—to treat foreign constitutional 
practices as more or less a tie-breaker in favor of the petitioner.105  
The “plus” factor provided by foreign law in this case was therefore 
sufficient to alter the result—compared both to a situation in which 
such foreign law sources were treated as irrelevant or having negative, 
rather than positive, significance.106 
The clearer the endorsement to a principle of partial constitu-
tional amendment by various members of the Court, the more likely 
it also is that Congress will in fact rely on Article V in a way that pro-
duces this kind of result. 
At present, given the difficulty of successfully invoking Article V, 
there is a clear disincentive to proponents of constitutional change 
relying on Article V.  For any proposed amendment under Article V, 
the expected persuasion costs can be expected to be moderate to 
high.  At the same time, the expected benefits will be quite low.  Par-
ticularly if there is partisan disagreement on a constitutional issue, 
the chances of actual successful amendment will be extremely low.107  
 
103 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
104 Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
105 See Knight, 528 U.S. at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Willingness to consider foreign judi-
cial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a 
‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’”). 
106 For this latter view, see Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining why 
foreign law is irrelevant to the decision in Knight). 
107 See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 29–35 (discussing the difficulty certain amendments 
have faced throughout the passage process). 
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There is also the danger that, rather than improving the chances of 
persuading the Supreme Court to redirect constitutional meaning, a 
partial amendment may (on the logic of Justice Powell’s approach in 
Frontiero) actually decrease the chances of successful change by paral-
lel common law means. 
It is thus not surprising that, in recent decades, there have been 
only four instances in which even a majority of Congress has voted in 
favor of proposed amendments under Article V—namely, those in-
volving the ERA itself; the proposed amendment approved by the 
95th Congress to give Washington, D.C. statehood; the balanced 
budget amendment approved by the 97th Congress; and the pro-
posed flag burning amendment approved by a majority of every Con-
gress since 1995.108 
If the Court, however, were to endorse a principle of partial con-
stitutional amendment, there would be a much greater incentive for 
proponents of constitutional change to propose amendments and 
put them to a floor vote in a form that could lead such proposals to 
obtain ordinary majority, if not super-majority, support.109  All majori-
ty-supported amendment proposals would have a clear chance of ex-
erting a positive influence on the ultimate direction of the Court’s 
approach to constitutional meaning.  The act of proposing an 
amendment would also carry few dangers or costs for legislators 
beyond the persuasion costs associated with invoking Article V.   
One potential consequence of this, of course, could be to reduce 
the current capacity of Article V to signal the strength of congres-
sional opinion on particular constitutional questions.110  If members 
of Congress were to invoke Article V with a view simply to achieving a 
partial constitutional amendment, for example, the use of Article V 
would clearly convey limited information about the strength of con-
gressional constitutional understandings.  Such a result, however, 
seems unlikely, given the strength of popular identification with the 
Constitution and the persuasion costs this implies for any use of Ar-
ticle V.111 
Even if it were to occur, Article V legislation would still also have 
the capacity to provide useful information about the breadth of dem-
ocratic constitutional understandings.112  The more conscious mem-
 
108 See generally VILE, supra note 61.   
109 See, e.g., infra note 132. 
110 Cf. supra note 24. 
111 Rather, it seems much more likely that, in such circumstances Congress would rely on a 
joint resolution rather than Article V proposal. 
112 See supra notes 25–27. 
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bers of Congress were of the potential informational consequences of 
proposed amendments, the more likely it would also be that they 
would vote sincerely, rather than strategically, on all proposals under 
Article V in a way that further increased the reliability of this informa-
tion.113 
IV.  OBJECTIONS & ANSWERS 
There are, as noted at the outset, a number of potential indepen-
dent objections to a principle of partial amendment and, as part of 
an attempt to develop and defend such a principle, each seems worth 
exploring in some detail. 
A.  The Text-Based Objection 
One objection is that such a principle would be inconsistent with 
the text of Article V, which reads that, when proposed by either two-
thirds of both Houses of Congress or by a Convention called by the 
states and ratified by the legislatures of (or conventions in) three-
quarters of the states, an amendment “shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution.” This objection also has special 
forces if Article V is read against the backdrop of the maxim expressio 
 
113 For amendments proposed prior to the Court endorsing a principle of partial constitu-
tional amendment, this will not necessarily always be the case.  There have, however, only 
been four recent amendments that could possibly qualify for the retrospective application 
of such a principle:  the ERA; the proposed amendment approved by the 95th Congress to 
give Washington, D.C. statehood; the balanced budget amendment approved by the 97th 
Congress; and the proposed flag burning amendment approved by a majority of every 
Congress since 1995.  See, e.g., H.J. Res. 90 (180-163); H.J. Res. 103 (271-153); S.J. Res. 41 
(63-37); S.J.Res. 1 (66-34); S.J. Res. 180, 106th Cong. (1989); H.J. Res. 10 (286-130); S.J. 
Res. 12 (66-34); The Failed Amendments, U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE (Jan 24, 2010), 
http://www.usconstitution.net/constamfail.html. 
   Historically, three other proposed amendments that would have been potential par-
tial amendments include the House Size Amendment (Article 1 of the original Bill of 
Rights, setting a non-retrogression standard for size of the House, once it reached 100 
and then 200); the Anti-Title Amendment (seeking to strip those receiving foreign titles 
of U.S. citizenship); and the Corwin Amendment (seeking to prevent any future amend-
ment giving Congress power over slavery or other “domestic institutions,” which is, of ob-
viously, of limited ongoing relevance given the Thirteenth Amendment).  See Some Pro-
posed Amendments, U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2010), 
http://www.usconstitution.net/constamprop.html.  However, of these, only the ERA and 
flag burning amendments could plausibly be thought to have any direct implication for 
common law constitutional interpretation.  An analysis of the voting record on flag-
burning amendments also shows little evidence of purely strategic, or non-typical ideolog-
ical voting.  See Dixon & Holden, Designing Constitutional Amendment Rules, supra note 33. 
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unius est exclusio alterius, and therefore as prescribing the exclusive 
mode for amending the Constitution.114 
As a formal matter, the most straightforward answer to this objec-
tion is that a principle of partial amendment does not purport to al-
low Congress or state legislatures to add to or subtract from the text 
of the Constitution outside the requirements of Article V.  Rather, it 
allows Congress and state legislatures to use Article V channels in or-
der to provide information to the Court, with a view to influencing 
the Court’s interpretation of existing constitutional text.  Because of 
this, a principle of partial constitutional amendment would also ob-
viously not go all the way to eliminating the hurdles Article V creates 
to Congress effectively influencing the direction of constitutional 
meaning. 
Where an amendment succeeds under Article V, this automatical-
ly has the effect of changing the text of the Constitution and not simp-
ly supplying information to the Court about democratic constitution-
al understandings.  Changes to the text of the Constitution will also 
have a capacity to influence constitutional outcomes in a far broader 
range of circumstances than where amendment processes simply pro-
vide information to the Court of this kind. 
For one thing, text-based constitutional changes will have a far 
greater capacity to affect the operation of constitutional rules, as op-
posed to standards.  Where the text of the Constitution is relatively 
“rule-like, concrete and specific,” there is broad consensus in the U.S. 
that the text must be treated as a form of direct “command” to the 
Court that cannot be overridden by other constitutional sources.115  
Even the strongest evidence of changing constitutional attitudes to-
ward particular rules will therefore be almost entirely irrelevant to the 
actual interpretation of those rules. 
Text-based constitutional changes will also have a greater capacity 
to be decisive of how courts actually decide particular cases, even in 
 
114 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:  Reflections on Free-Form Me-
thod in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1241 (1995) (arguing the lan-
guage in Article V indicates, given the Framer’s careful construction, that Article V is the 
only way to amend the Constitution). 
115 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 305 (2007); 
see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 121–23 (1977) (setting out the idea 
of “enactment force” as opposed to “gravitational force”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Con-
structivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1193–94 
(1987) (asserting there is a hierarchy of legal arguments in which “the implicit norms of 
our constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to arguments from text”).   
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cases involving more open-ended constitutional standards.116  Take 
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  By the time of 
the Slaughterhouse Cases, there was clearly no doubt in the minds of 
the Justices that strong democratic support existed for a decision to 
overrule Dred Scott—indeed, the Court explicitly noted that the deci-
sion had met with “condemnation [from] some of the ablest states-
men and constitutional lawyers of the country.”  But for the text of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Court still suggested there 
might have been some doubt as to whether it should overrule itself in 
Dred Scott.  It was only the text of the Amendment that “put at rest” 
any debate over this question.117 
At a more general level, when compared to most other approach-
es to gathering information about democratic values or understand-
ings, a principle of partial constitutional amendment will also do 
more to advance constitutional values implicit in the text of Article V, 
such as the commitment to broad public deliberation and state in-
volvement as part of the process of constitutional change.118 
In public opinion polls, or even popular referenda on constitu-
tional change, for example, there is no obligation for citizens to give 
reasons when voting on constitutional questions.  There is also no 
guarantee that, when voting in a referendum on a particular constitu-
tional question, citizens will be aware of, or give due consideration to, 
all relevant arguments and information.  There is therefore no guar-
antee that even the most minimal pre-requisites for deliberative de-
mocracy are met—i.e., that citizens approach constitutional questions 
from a standpoint of mutual respect and reciprocity.119 
 
116 This is particularly true where an amendment is directed toward overriding a particular 
court decision, because in this context, it will generally be drafted in a quite concrete, 
specific way.  See, e.g., Christopher P. Manfredi, Institutional Design and the Politics of Consti-
tutional Modification:  Understanding Amendment Failure in the United States and Canada, 31 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 111, 122 (1997). 
117 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872). 
118 See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding and Constitu-
tional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996). 
119 See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 50.  A variety of proposals have been made aimed at address-
ing these concerns.  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 
(2004) (suggesting a “deliberation day” experiment as part of attempts to make popular 
opinion polls more deliberative); Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 94, at 503 
(suggesting that voters in a referendum meet in local caucuses and be “electronically and 
interactively linked” to a national convention).  However, these proposals have obvious 
problems in terms of turn-out and participation, on the one hand, and the potential for 
group polarization on the other.  See, e.g., David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, 
What Happened on Deliberation Day?, (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, 
Working Paper 06-19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=911646. 
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Partial constitutional amendments, by contrast, are necessarily 
subject to stringent formal requirements of legislative debate and jus-
tification.  They are thus also more likely to meet substantive re-
quirements governing the preconditions for deliberative democracy. 
A similar position applies to the relationship between national 
opinion polls—and even a national referendum process—and other 
constitutional values implicit in Article V, such as the principle of re-
spect for state-level constitutional deliberation.120 
As sources of information about democratic constitutional under-
standings, such sources provide information that is highly insensitive 
to state-level variation in constitutional values and understandings.  
The answer given to this objection by leading proponents of mechan-
isms, such as a national referendum process, is also extremely reveal-
ing:  Akhil Amar, for example, suggests that the way in which to an-
swer this kind of federalism-based objection is to endorse the vision 
of federalism advanced by James Wilson, as opposed to James Madi-
son.121  It is clear, however, that from a historical perspective “Wil-
son . . . did not represent the thinking of significant numbers of his 
contemporaries,”122 and from a contemporary perspective, that Wil-
son’s approach is directly inconsistent with the approach of a majori-
ty of the Court in areas such as pre-emption, “commandeering”123 and 
the regulation of inter-state commerce.124 
Partial constitutional amendments, on the other hand, have the 
potential to provide the Court with quite detailed information about 
state-level variation in constitutional understandings.  The votes of 
 
120 For the federalism-based commitments implicit in Article V, see Monaghan, supra note 
117, at 159. 
121 See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 94, at 506–07 (explaining Wilson’s idea of 
federalism:  “the state people [are] clearly subordinate to the national people, just as state 
constitutions are subordinate to the national Constitution,” as opposed to Madison’s view 
of federalism:  “[o]rdinary government under the Constitution was neither wholly ‘na-
tional,’ nor purely ‘federal’ . . . . Neither the people of each state nor the people of the 
nation were wholly sovereign”). 
122 Monaghan, supra note 117, at 159. 
123 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (limiting the power of the federal 
government by holding that “[a]s an initial matter, Congress may not simply ‘comman-
dee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and en-
force a federal regulatory program’”) (alteration in original); see also Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (reasserting the holding in New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992)). 
124 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming the holding that “section 
922(q)[of the Gun Free School Zone’s Act], in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as 
beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause”); see also United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (limiting Congress’ use of the Commerce Clause fur-
ther by striking down as unconstitutional the Violence Against Women Act). 
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individual members of Congress on particular proposed amendments 
will almost always provide the Court with some information about var-
iation in constitutional understandings by state and region, as well as 
political party.  In the case of actual proposed amendments, the rati-
fying decisions of state legislatures will also provide a further source 
of information to the Court about state-level democratic constitu-
tional variation.  By varying the level of positive weight given to par-
ticular proposed amendments, according to the degree of support 
they receive at a state level, a principle of partial constitutional 
amendment also further helps promote the role of state legislatures 
in the overall process of constitutional change and dialogue. 
B.  The Minority Rights Objection 
A second, potential objection to a principle of partial amendment 
is that it could move the Court too far in a pro-majoritarian direction, 
and thereby undermine the role the Supreme Court is able to play—
at least according to scholars such as John Ely —in protecting the 
channels of political change and “discrete and insular” or other his-
torically disadvantaged minorities in the political system.125  Such a 
concern seems especially salient now, as opposed to in, say, the 1980s 
or 1990s, given that the most recent attempts to use Article V have 
tended to focus on the rights of a group (i.e., gays and lesbians) that 
is, in fact, a clear political as well as historically disadvantaged minori-
ty.126 
There are, however, at least two answers to this objection:  first, 
that a principle of partial constitutional amendment would not apply 
equally across all areas; and second, there are in any event limits to 
 
125 Such an objection is also leveled against proposals for a national referendum as an alter-
native to Article V.  See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 94, at 457 (“We the 
People of the United States have a legal right to . . . change our Constitution—via a majo-
ritarian and populist mechanism akin to a national referendum, even though that me-
chanism is not explicitly specified in Article V.”).  It is, of course, also important to note 
in this context that a prime example in support of this argument could be the Corwin 
Amendment, at least from the perspective of its potential effect, under a principle of par-
tial constitutional amendment, during the Civil War.  See A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping 
Time:  The Pro-Slavery and “Irrevocable” Thirteenth Amendment, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
501, 504 (2003) (explaining that the Corwin Amendment set forth an argument that 
Congress could use Article V to limit the Article V power itself). 
126 See e.g., H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
tion that marriage “shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman.  Neither this 
Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that mar-
riage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of 
a man and a woman”); H.R.J. Res. 88, 109th Cong. (2006) (re-proposing the Marriage 
Protection Amendment). 
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how effective the Supreme Court will be in seeking to advance a par-
ticular formal conception of constitutional meaning in the face of 
widespread substantive democratic disagreement. 
Take two recent areas of constitutional controversy involving a re-
fusal by the Court to respond to attempts by Congress or state legisla-
tures to redirect common law constitutional meaning:  abortion and 
flag burning. 
In the abortion context, there is a very real argument that in cases 
such as Thornburgh, Akron or Webster, if the Court had endorsed a 
principle of partial constitutional amendment, Article V proposals 
would have encouraged at least some Justices (i.e., Justices Kennedy 
and O’Connor, possibly Chief Justice Burger, and even Justice Pow-
ell)127 to retreat from the most counter-majoritarian aspects of its de-
cision in Roe (namely the holding that the government is prevented 
prior to viability from imposing any (non-trivial) measure designed to 
protect fetal life, or discourage a woman from seeking an abortion)128 
and defer to a greater number of legislative attempts to regulate 
access to abortion. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is an area 
where, implicitly at least, the Court has shown a clear willingness to 
take into account the nation’s “evolving” traditions regarding the 
recognition of particular liberty interests.129  Had a principle of partial 
 
127 While a party of the majority opinion in Roe and Akron, Chief Justice Burger dissented in 
Thornburgh.  See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 782–83 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (finding that the court had gone beyond 
the limitations expressed in Roe and finding that states should be able to provide women 
with medical information concerning the risks inherent in the medical procedure of an 
abortion).  While indicating sympathy for attempts to narrow Roe, both Justices Kennedy 
and O’Connor also avoided direct consideration of the issue in Webster.  See Webster v. 
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520–21 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., with White, J., Sca-
lia, J. & Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Both appellants and the United States as amicus curiae 
have urged that we overrule our decision in Roe v. Wade.  The facts of the present case, 
however, differ from those at issue in Roe. . . . This case therefore affords us no occasion 
to revisit the holding of Roe . . . .” (citations omitted)); id. at 521 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (holding that there was no need to reconsider Roe).  Justice Powell was a much fir-
mer supporter of Roe, but like the plurality in Casey, suggested that the requirements of 
stare decisis were a prime reason for continuing to adhere to this approach.  City of Akron 
v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419–20 (1983). 
128 For the view that this, but not necessarily, other parts of Roe are counter-majoritarian, see 
NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES:  ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE 74 (1996) (noting that many Americans support re-
strictions on access to abortion services). 
129 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (considering historical traditions regarding 
the prohibition of sodomy, and pointing to “an emerging awareness that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
ters pertaining to sex”).  Whatever the Court said in Casey itself about its unwillingness to 
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amendment been recognized by the Court prior to Casey, it is also far 
more likely that opponents of Roe would have proposed more mod-
erate “human life amendments,” which aimed to narrow rather than 
wholly overrule Roe and which could thus have gained at least ordi-
nary majority support in Congress.130 
Had this been true, in cases such as Akron, Thornburgh or Webster, 
there would then have been much clearer “objective”131 evidence 
available to the Court that there was strong democratic disagreement 
with various aspects of Roe.  Evidence of this kind would also have 
been generated in a way that was more consistent with respect for the 
doctrine of stare decisis than the actual evidence before the Court in 
these cases regarding democratic “backlash.”132  For at least some Jus-
tices, therefore, it could have provided a much stronger basis for a 
decision to defer to legislative attempts at dialogue.133 
A quite different position applies in the context of the constitu-
tional controversy over flag burning and the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Johnson and Eichman.  While there would clearly have been 
the potential for the Court to apply a principle of partial constitu-
tional amendment in a case such as Eichman,134 in practice, it seems 
 
take democratic opposition to Roe into account, most commentators suggest that it in fact 
did so, to at least some degree.  See, e.g., DEVINS, supra note 127, at 73–74 (noting that 
many commentators claimed that the Court in Casey was more driven by public opinion 
than constitutional principle; he also presents public opinion data showing peoples sup-
port for abortion restrictions); Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty 
Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1330–32 (2009) (positing that the Court 
is a product of its times and “[a]ccordingly, the very forces that pushed the Supreme 
Court to embrace the undue burden test make it extremely unlikely that the Court will 
disavow Casey in favor of pro-choice or pro-life absolutism”). 
130 See, e.g., DEVINS, supra note 127, at 88–89 (noting the 49-50 vote for the 1981 “Human Life 
Federalism Amendment”). 
131 For the Court itself in Casey, the presence of an “objective” medical basis for reconsider-
ing certain elements of the Court’s reasoning in Roe also appears to have been crucial to 
the willingness of the Court to overrule that part of its prior holding in Roe, which pre-
vented the state from taking measures designed to protect fetal life prior to viability.  
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992); Akron, 462 U.S. at 458 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the changes in viability which put the trimester ap-
proach on a collision course with itself). 
132 See Klarman, supra note 52 (stating that Roe was one of a few court decisions to slow caus-
es they “purported to benefit” while sometimes producing “larger political conse-
quences”).   
133 This seems particularly true in the case of Justice Powell, who was also pivotal in many 
abortion cases, see Klarman, supra note 52 (“Justice Powell, who proved increasingly essen-
tial over time to the maintenance of a prochoice [sic] majority on the Court, viscerally re-
sisted state efforts—as he perceived them—to defy Roe . . . .”). 
134 Even as early as 1989, there was clear majority support in both the House and Senate in 
favor of a constitutional amendment giving Congress explicit authority to pass legislation 
such as the FPA.  See supra note 61. 
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extremely unlikely that recognition of such a principle would have 
had any effect on the Court’s ultimate approach in Eichman.  The ma-
jority in the case held that:  “any suggestion that the Government’s 
interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular op-
position to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment,” 
thereby suggesting that even the strongest evidence of democratic 
disagreement would have been irrelevant to its ultimate decision.135 
As to those areas such as abortion, where a principle of partial 
constitutional amendment could potentially lead to more pro-
majoritarian constitutional outcomes, it also seems doubtful that this 
would in fact change the enjoyment of actual constitutional rights, by 
most Americans, on the ground. 
As scholars such as Gerry Rosenberg and Michael Klarman have 
shown, there are a number of reasons why, if the Court attempts to 
protect individual rights in the face of clear opposition from a majori-
ty of Americans, it is unlikely to be effective in achieving its aims.136  
One reason is that in a decentralized judicial system such as that of 
the U.S., many federal district courts and state courts will refuse to 
give practical effect to such a ruling and will in most cases be able to 
do so without facing any meaningful prospect of review by the Court 
itself.137  Another reason is that the meaningful protection of individ-
ual rights will often require active government support or expendi-
ture, which will clearly be lacking if there is broad political opposition 
to particular constitutional change.138  A third reason is that, if partic-
ular rights are sufficiently unpopular, they will tend to generate a 
form of counter-mobilization or backlash that not only limits the en-
joyment of the particular right in question, but often also the broader 
political rights and interests of the citizens the Court is concerned to 
 
135 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990). 
136 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:  CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
336, 338–41 (1991) (“U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant so-
cial reform. . . . [T]he data suggest that they may mobilize opponents.”); see also MICHAEL 
J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 
104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 475 (2005) [hereinafter Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goo-
dridge)] (finding that the decisions of Lawrence and Goodridge produced political backlash 
and “greater resistance than change accomplished through legislatures”); Klarman, supra 
note 52, at 1 (stating that Roe was one of a few “court decision that seem[ed] to retard the 
causes they purport[ed] to benefit while sometimes also producing larger political conse-
quences”). 
137 ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 18. 
138 Id. at 20–21. 
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protect.139  Together, these factors all combine to mean that, except 
in certain limited circumstances, by simply refusing as a formal legal 
matter to overrule a prior counter-majoritarian or blocking decision, 
the Court will tend to have limited capacity to increase the actual en-
joyment of rights those decisions may promise. 
This pattern has also been largely true, as Rosenberg and others 
have shown, in the context of Roe itself.140  For women seeking an 
abortion in the years after Roe, one clear benefit of Roe has been that 
it has encouraged a large increase in the number of safe, legal abor-
tion providers operating across the country—particularly in a sub-set 
of states.141  By creating a constitutional barrier to measures that im-
pose a significant financial hurdle to access (such as, for example, the 
hospitalization requirements at issue in Akron), it also arguably 
helped keep abortion affordable for large numbers of women.142  At 
the same time, the initial opposition to the Court’s reasoning in Roe, 
and the fact that this has only increased in many parts of the country 
with the growth of the “pro-life” lobby, have meant that, in many in-
stances, Roe has been ineffectual in preventing state legislatures from 
enacting measures such as mandatory counseling and waiting period 
requirements designed to discourage women from seeking an abor-
tion.143 
As a result, the ultimate decision by the Court in Casey formally to 
overrule that part of Roe that stood in the way of such measures (pro-
vided they do not impose an “undue burden” on access to abor-
tion144) has also tended to have a limited effect on most women’s ac-
 
139 See Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), supra note 135, at 482 (stating deci-
sions which outpace “public opinion on issues of social reform . . . mobilize opponents, 
undercut moderates, and retard the cause they purport to advance”). 
140 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 173–268 (finding that Roe did not raise sensitivity 
to women’s right issues and instead government officials “were actually more hostile after 
Court action than before it,” and press coverage and public opinion were not responsive 
to the Court’s actions as well). 
141 DEVINS, supra note 127, at 140–41; ROSENBERG supra note 135, at 196. 
142 DEVINS, supra note 127, at 140–41; ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 195–201.   
143 On the relevant legislation, see, e.g., DEVINS, supra note 127, at 61, 66; ROSENBERG supra 
note 135, at 187.  On the rise of pro-life political forces as a contributing factor in this 
context, see, e.g., DEVINS, supra note 127, at 62–63 (finding that the pro-life movement 
grew dramatically after 1978, thus propelling its importance in political campaigns and 
for single issue voters). 
144 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)–.  This aspect of Casey is 
an extremely important qualification to the claim that little would have changed from re-
treating from the Casey framework because of the potential for regulation otherwise to 
require that abortions be performed in hospitals—which are both unavailable and unne-
cessarily expensive as abortion providers.  See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 135, at 189–95; 
see also supra note 147.  For other arguments about the potentially far-reaching conse-
quences of a decision more broadly to overrule Roe, see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe 
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tual level of access to abortion.145 There is, for example, no evidence 
that in the wake of Casey the states introduced new measures designed 
to discourage access to abortion (i.e., measures not already de facto in 
place prior to 1992) and that these measures significantly increased 
the cost of abortion for most women.  (On most inflation-adjusted 
measures, the cost of abortion stayed largely stable throughout the 
1990s.146)  While there was a slight decrease in the overall rate of 
abortion following Casey, this change was both small and also evident 
as a trend well prior to the decision.147  Thus, even though for many 
the Casey decision may have carried significant symbolic importance, 
at a more concrete level, it is far less clear that it actually altered the 
enjoyment of basic reproductive rights for most women. 
C.  The Majoritarian Objection 
A third and quite different possible objection to a principle of 
partial amendment is that, if it were actually endorsed by a majority 
of the Court, it could actually lead some Justices to uphold fewer, ra-
ther than more, legislative attempts at constitutional dialogue, by vir-
tue of the same kind of negative inference dynamic implicit in Justice 
Powell’s concurrence in Frontiero. 
Just as it is possible that some Justices might currently decide to 
treat the failure of a proposed amendment under Article V as evi-
dence of a lack of democratic support for constitutional change in a 
certain direction, so too it is possible that, if a principle of partial 
amendment were recognized, these same Justices might decide that a 
failure by Congress to use Article V as part of the attempt to engage 
in dialogue should weigh against a subsequent decision to uphold 
 
Were Overruled;  Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 
614 (2007) (“[A]n overruling of Roe would not withdraw abortion-related questions form 
the courts, but instead would present the Court with a new set of morally freighted ques-
tions to replace the older set that has now grown familiar.”). 
145 For related arguments criticizing the initial breadth of Roe in this context, see CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 17–18 
(1999) (saying that Roe was a wide decision since it was broad in its coverage of abortion 
issues).  But for consideration of what the potential consequences of a broader overruling 
of Roe might have been, see also Fallon, supra note 143. 
146 See Cynthia C. Harper, Jillian T. Henderson & Philip D. Darney, Abortion in the United 
States, 26 ANNU. REV. PUB. HEALTH 501, 505–06 (2005) (noting that, adjusted for infla-
tion, costs of surgical abortion remained steady until the late nineties, and then began to 
rise).  In 2005, the average cost of an abortion was $413.  See Rachel K. Jones et al., Abor-
tion in the United States:  Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND 
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 15 (2008) available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
journals/4000608.pdf. 
147 Id. 
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that attempt at dialogue.  If this were the case, but Congress still de-
clined routinely to invoke Article V, this could then lead to an overall 
decrease, rather than increase, in the ability of Congress successfully 
to influence the direction of constitutional meaning. 
While such a result is certainly possible, in practice it seems un-
likely for at least two reasons.  One reason is that in order to endorse 
a principle of partial constitutional amendment members of the 
Court must be willing to show a degree of interpretive flexibility, as 
opposed to rigid adherence to abstract legal formulae, that weighs 
against any subsequent decision mechanically to apply a presumption 
of expressio  unius to any aspect of Article V.148 
A second reason is that, if the Court were in fact to take such an 
approach, it is extremely likely that Congress would make quite con-
sistent use of Article V in order to promote constitutional dialogue. 
At a state constitutional level, at least, there has tended to be a 
clear positive correlation between the rate of successful constitutional 
amendment in a given year and the probability of successful constitu-
tional amendment in the subsequent successive time periods.  In a 
study co-authored with Richard Holden, I have shown, for example, 
that, for current constitutions at a state level in the United States, 
there has been a clear and significant positive relationship between 
the probability of amendment in a given year and the subsequent 
probability of successful amendment—or between a variable AMEND 
and lagged AMEND (where the lag was measured up to 20 years).149  
The strength of this relationship is also significant.  For example, if a 
state amends its constitution in a given year, it is 2.8 times more likely 
than other states to amend it again 2 years later, and 1.9 times more 
likely to do so 4 years later.150  There is a strong degree of persistence 
for this effect, with the odds ratio of amendment still standing at 1.4 
 
148 For the connection between this kind of more general interpretive flexibility and rejec-
tion of a strict application of the exclusio unius maxim, see, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 472–73 (1998) (Breyer, J., with O’Connor and Scalia JJ., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Constitution allows for innovation and a workable government, and the Act in 
question may come close to violating the limit of constitutionality, but it does not literally 
violate the Constitution’s words); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 844–
45 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting arguments that all legislative actors, rather 
than simply state voters or legislatures, were precluded from imposing term limits).   
149 See, e.g., Dixon & Holden, Designing Constitutional Amendment Rules, supra note 33, at tbl.5 
(presenting data on amendment probability).  We found this effect using a logistic re-
gression technique, which is standard as a means of testing for the presence of “streaks” 
or runs in the occurrence of certain factors. 
150 This was after controlling for a range of other covariates, including the formal difficulty 
of amendment. 
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after 10 years.  These findings are also statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
At least one plausible explanation for this is that, the more infre-
quent is the use of formal processes of constitutional amendment, 
the more such processes come to be regarded by the broader public 
and academic commentators with suspicion, in a way that then adds 
even further to the political, as opposed to legal, hurdles to successful 
constitutional amendment.151  By reversing the recent non-use of Ar-
ticle V, therefore, a principle of partial amendment would tend to 
reduce these informal, as opposed to more formal, hurdles to consti-
tutional amendment and thereby increase the prospects of both fre-
quent partial and completed constitutional amendment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
To suggest that Article V of the Constitution is too onerous, or 
that this may have some real consequences for democratic constitu-
tionalism in the U.S., is far from radical.  While certainly contested, it 
is a position advanced by numerous previous scholars, from Donald 
Lutz to Sandy Levinson.152  But how radical is it to propose a principle 
of partial constitutional amendment as a solution to this problem? 
In two ways, at least, the idea of the Court’s recognizing failed 
amendments as partial amendments is potentially quite radical.  
From the perspective of the Court, it implies at least one important 
departure from the current orthodoxy when it comes to the most 
specific rule-like provisions of the Constitution—namely, that the 
Court should always interpret such provisions in a wholly static and 
literal way, without regard to the merits in a particular case of a more 
dynamic, evolutionary approach to constitutional meaning.153 
From a more theoretical perspective, endorsement of such a prin-
ciple also serves to challenge a long-established assumption among 
constitutional scholars that there is a clear line to be drawn between, 
 
151 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, 23 AM. PROSPECT 20, 25–27 
(1995) (arguing against constitutional amendments by legislative bodies because of the 
possibility of causing tension with the original document and undermining the respect 
and legitimacy the court now enjoys as an interpreter).  For discussion, see also ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009) 
152 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 165–66 (2006) (“Article V 
constitutes an iron cage with regard to changing some of the most important aspects of 
our political system.”). 
153 See Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, supra note 48, at 321 (suggesting that, “because of 
concerns about ‘fidelity’ and also institutional capacity, the literal meaning of the text of 
the Constitution should almost always be controlling”). 
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on the one hand, forms of constitutional change labeled “amend-
ments” and, on the other, forms of constitutional change which ei-
ther involve less formal processes of popular or legislative input or 
leave a less formal legal deposit as an end product.154 
However, in other ways, a principle of partial constitutional 
amendment is also far from radical—at least in the changes it implies 
for actual Supreme Court practice.  Even as a theoretical matter, 
there are limits to the aims of such a principle when it comes to 
changing the Supreme Court’s approach to legislative attempts at af-
fecting the direction of constitutional meaning.  As a mechanism for 
promoting dialogue, the principle is not intended to provide an ex-
haustive means by which Congress or state legislatures can influence 
constitutional meaning.  Rather, it seeks to complement existing, 
more ordinary legislative means by which Congress can achieve this 
by providing an additional “plus” factor in support of the validity of 
such attempts at dialogue.155  A key premise of the principle is also 
that it will have the capacity to influence constitutional outcomes in 
only some cases—where a majority of the Court itself is already open 
to taking democratic constitutional amendment into account and re-
gards other constitutional factors as relatively finely-balanced.  At the 
level of precedent, support for such a principle can also found, 
beyond Justice Brennan’s own opinion in Frontiero, in the approach of 
the Supreme Court of India to amendments passed under Article 368 
of the 1950 Indian Constitution. 
Under Article 368, most amendments to the Indian Constitution 
require the support of only a simple majority of the Lok Sabha, or 
lower house of the Indian Parliament (provided this number 
represents no less than two-thirds of the total number of representa-
 
154 This distinction has been under attack in recent years, but remains powerful in the con-
stitutional imagination in the United States and elsewhere.  See Sanford Levinson, How 
Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended?  (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 
27:  Accounting for Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 10, 
at 13 (distinguishing between organic changes that come from within the Constitution 
and amendments which have a distinctive birth process of their own); Lutz, supra note 10, 
at 240 (drawing a distinction between amendment, which is the formal process developed 
by Americans, and revision, which is a process that uses the legislature or judiciary). 
155 Another complementary principle that I have argued that courts should endorse if they 
wish to engage in forms of judicial review that are both maximally dialogic and democrat-
ically sensitive is a principle of “narrow restatement.”  See Dixon, Updating Constitutional 
Rules, supra note 48, at 345 (“[T]he Court should give some degree of positive force to 
proposed and failed, as well as successful, constitutional amendments, according to the 
degree of support they receive in Congress and state legislatures.”). 
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tives).156  The flexibility implicit in Article 368 also has frequently 
been used by Indian governments to entrench, or at least insulate 
from judicial review, a range of controversial policy objectives, includ-
ing during the Emergency of the 1970’s.157  Many commentators have 
therefore suggested that, in contrast to the United States, the formal 
requirements for constitutional amendment in India have proven 
substantially too permissive.158 
The response of the Supreme Court of India to this criticism has 
been to impose certain additional “implied” hurdles to the legal ef-
fectiveness of constitutional amendments under Article 368, which 
hurdles have the effect that even successful constitutional amend-
ments in India enjoy varying legal force.159  Most notably, in Kesava-
nanda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala,160 a decision of a 13-
judge bench, the SCI held that that Article 368 could not validly be 
used to amend the “basic structure” of the Constitution, including 
the “essence” of fundamental rights guarantees in the Constitution, 
such as the right to property and judicial review.  As a result, the 
Court refused to give full legal effect to the 1971 Constitution (Twen-
ty-Fifth) Amendment Act, which sought to provide that where the 
compulsory acquisition of property required Parliament to give to the 
owner of the property “an amount fixed by law” rather than “com-
pensation,” no law could “be called into question in any court on the 
ground that the amount so fixed or determined [was] not adequate 
or that the whole or any part of such amount [was] to be given oth-
 
156 Subject to certain subject-matter specific exceptions, Article 368(2) provides that in gen-
eral: 
An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated . . . by the introduction of a 
Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in 
each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority 
of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, [it 
shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and the-
reupon] the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the 
Bill.   
  INDIA CONST. art. 368, § 2 (alteration in the original).   
157 See, e.g., PARAS DIWAN & PEEYUSHI DIWAN, AMENDING POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS:  FROM FIRST TO THE LATEST AMENDMENT (2d rev. ed. 1997). 
158 Id.; see also P.B. Mukharji, The Indian Constitution:  The Debate Continues in Constitutional 
Amendments—A Study, 9, 22–23 (Sukumar Biswas ed., 1977) (noting “widespread opinion” 
in 1977 that the amendment power had been overused by the executive, without ade-
quate legislative checks). 
159 See, e.g., Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution?  A Constitutional Perspec-
tive, 4 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 460, 473, 475 (2006) (discussing how even though the Court ac-
knowledged Parliament’s right to make amendments under Article 368 it did not accept 
the argument that Parliament could do anything it wanted through the amendment pow-
er). 
160 A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India). 
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erwise than in cash.”161  In an earlier decision, I.C. Golaknath v. State of 
Punjab,162 the Court indicated a willingness to give an even lesser de-
gree of force to constitutional amendments, on the basis that 
amendments were “laws” to which the fundamental rights guarantees 
in the Constitution applied.  On this theory, the Court also held that 
the Fourth Amendment, the import of which was that “no 
law . . . shall be called in question in any court on the ground that 
compensation provided by [it] is inadequate,” had no effect what-
soever on the validity of legislation seeking to promote land reform 
or to nationalize private property.163 
Though it is not always fully appreciated even in India, there has 
also been a striking correlation between the degree to which the SCI 
has been willing to give partial effect to constitutional amendments 
and the degree of support particular amendments enjoyed in the Lok 
Sabha at the time of enactment.164  The Twenty-fifth Amendment, for 
example, received 355 out of 518 votes, or 68% super-majority sup-
port, in the Lok Sabha and also meaningful support from the opposi-
tion as well as the Congress Party.165  The Fourth Amendment, by con-
trast, obtained the support of only 302 out of 499 members—or 
60%—of the Lok Sabha, at a time when the Congress Party con-
trolled 74% of seats.166  The different degrees of legislative support 
the two amendments enjoyed in this context also mapped on quite 
clearly to the degree of force the SCI was willing to give each 
amendment.  The SCI, therefore, has to a large degree already devel-
oped a principle of partial amendment—albeit in inverse form. 
One might still ask, of course, whether it is realistic to expect that 
any Justice would ever endorse such a principle in the abstract, and 
there can be no definitive answer to this question.167 
 
161 Id. at para. 428 (2). 
162 A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 (India). 
163 U.S. CONT. AMEND. IV.   
164 A much more generally noticed feature of this jurisprudence is the degree to which, after 
initial criticism, it won broad support for helping to restrict the capacity of Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi to use Article 368 in order for self-entrenchment purposes.  See, e.g., Sujit 
Choudhry, “He Had a Mandate:”  The South African Constitutional Court and the African Na-
tional Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy (Constitutional Law Workshop, Univ. of Chi-
cago Law School, Feb. 11, 2009) (on file with author). 
165 See Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461, Par. 2089 
(India). 
166 See G. G. MIRCHANDANI, SUBVERTING THE CONSTITUTION 24 (1977). 
167 I am inclined to rule out the possibility of what Jake Gersen and Adrian Vermeule call 
“congressional supply” of such a principle because of separation of powers concerns.  But 
see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2086 (2002) (rejecting separation of powers-based arguments); see also Jacob E. 
Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 679–80 (2007) 
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There are at least two reasons, however, why a Justice might be will-
ing in the abstract to endorse such a principle of deference to majori-
tarian law-making processes, while rejecting it in a more specific con-
text.  As Adam Samaha has noted, in an experimental setting, there is 
strong evidence to suggest that individuals behave differently, de-
pending on the stakes involved in a particular decision, and in par-
ticular, that they seem more willing to take risks in low, as opposed to 
high, stakes settings.168  Therefore, if abstracting from a particular 
concrete controversy helps a decision to endorse a principle of defe-
rence to legislative constitutional judgments seem “lower risk,” this 
may have some capacity to encourage a greater willingness on the 
part of a judge to endorse such a principle.169 
For some Justices, another reason to endorse a principle of partial 
amendment could be a desire to take a more pro-active role in ad-
vancing their own preferred (first-best) understanding of constitu-
tional meaning in a range of first look cases.170  Absent some realistic 
possibility of legislative override under Article V, some Justices may 
feel, for example, that it is inappropriate to assume too active a role 
in developing constitutional meaning because, if they err, especially 
when it comes to judging democratic constitutional understandings, 
there is little realistic prospect of their reversal, within a reasonable 
time-frame.171  The main existing mechanism for avoiding this prob-
 
(arguing that deference to administrative agencies should be a voting rule and supports 
making deference an “aggregate property that arises from the whole set of votes”). 
168 See Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation (University of Chicago 
Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 318, 2010), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html (“Some notable studies 
find that lower stakes are associated with lower levels of risk aversion, or at least greater 
variance in risk aversion levels.”). 
169 Related arguments could also be made that the effect of such abstraction is to create a 
partial veil of ignorance for relevant justices about the substantive results of particular 
principles, therefore changing their decision-making behavior in this regard.  See, e.g., 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY:  INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 
145–46 (2007) (discussing the effect of such veil effects more generally and arguing that 
institutionalized deference requires the judge “to internalize a legal norm of deference, 
but it is accompanied by none of the traditional mechanisms law uses to force decisions-
makers to internalize the consequences of their choices”). 
170 On the distinction between first and second look cases, see Dixon, The Supreme Court of 
Canada, supra note 8, at 241 (explaining that first look cases are when the Court lacks in-
formation about the legislative body’s views of the Constitution on a certain issue, and 
second look cases are when the Court has direct information from recent legislative ac-
tions or debate). 
171 See SUNSTEIN supra note 144, at 16–19 (arguing that many judicial decisions are minimal-
ist along certain dimensions since they do not touch other possible cases, or their ratio-
nale does not extend much further than its holding). 
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lem—narrow forms of reasoning172—is also far from perfect in allow-
ing members of the Court simultaneously to advance their own pre-
ferred ideas about constitutional meaning and to promote the rever-
sibility of Court decisions.173  If a principle of partial amendment was 
understood to increase opportunities for legislative reversal, while al-
so allowing individual Justices greater freedom in most cases to pur-
sue their own preferred approach to constitutional decision-making, 
for some Justices it might therefore appear a principle worth endors-
ing. 
In a context where there are such important potential democratic 
stakes, this is also all that seems necessary in order to make the theo-




173 If adhered to strictly, it inevitably constrains judges to reason “shallowly,” or in a way that 
avoids direct appeal to ethical or normative constitutional considerations, and for some 
justices, this will be a serious constraint on their preferred approach to constitutional ar-
gument and persuasion.  See Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, supra note 48, at 322, 
337. 
